Operational impact · Financial exposure
BreachCalc
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INCIDENT LAB / WATERWORKS
Three sites.
One shrinking reserve.
A cyber disruption unfolds across a fictional water network.
Explore how local readiness changes service continuity.
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Demand stays at 300 m³/h
Initial usable reserve: 600 m³
Network hydraulics are not modeled.
Orange / disruption · Amber / controlled response
Lines show shared exposure, not a verified intrusion route.
Interactive exercise, not live utility telemetry. Water quality, pressure and affected population cannot be inferred from these volumes.
STAGE 1 / 5
One exposure. Three sites.
Research, model assumptions & transcript
Documented campaign: The December 2023 joint CISA advisory described IRGC-affiliated CyberAv3ngers activity against Unitronics controllers across multiple sectors, including water and wastewater. Public internet exposure and default passwords were highlighted. This supports a common-exposure scenario, not proof of a single connected regional outage.
Different real outcomes: WaterISAC’s November 30, 2023 advisory described the Aliquippa booster-station compromise and manual operation, with no known risk to water supply reported. Separately, The Record’s December 11, 2023 reporting quoted Ireland’s environment department: a cyberattack caused outages for approximately 160 households over two days in the Erris area of County Mayo. These were distinct incidents; neither establishes the three-site topology or timeline used here.
Scope of official findings: Treasury’s February 2, 2024 sanctions announcement said the particular controller-defacement operation it addressed did not disrupt critical services. That statement and the separately reported Irish outage have different scopes; this exercise does not combine them into a claimed historical regional shutdown.
Fictional assumptions: Three independent pumping sites each normally supply 100 m³/h. Demand is constant at 300 m³/h, with 600 m³ initially usable reserve. The model pools all supply and demand, assumes unrestricted delivery of reserve, and excludes hydraulics, losses, treatment chemistry, customer counts and health outcomes. Response capacities and recovery times are chosen for comparison, not measured incident data.
| Interval | Limited fallback | Rehearsed local operation |
|---|---|---|
| 0–2 hours | 300 m³/h | 300 m³/h |
| 2–6 hours | 60 m³/h | 210 m³/h |
| 6–12 hours | 180 m³/h | 300 m³/h |
| At hour 12 | 300 m³/h | 300 m³/h |
For each interval: shortfall = (demand − pumping output) × hours; reserve draw = min(remaining reserve, shortfall); unmet demand increases by shortfall − reserve draw. Limited fallback empties reserve at T+4.5 h and yields 1,080 m³ unmet demand by T+12 h. Rehearsed local operation retains 240 m³ reserve and yields zero unmet demand. Pumping at demand rate does not refill reserve or erase earlier unmet demand.
Metrics are snapshots at chapter boundaries. Narration compresses the exercise clock; muted chapters advance at reading pace. These results do not change the financial calculator below. Response branches are discussion aids, not operating instructions.
- CISA · December 1, 2023 joint advisory announcement
- WaterISAC · November 30, 2023 Aliquippa advisory
- The Record · December 11, 2023 County Mayo outage reporting
- U.S. Treasury · February 2, 2024 campaign scope statement
Read the full Bruce Mellow narration transcript
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